Formal verification
Can a change to a contract, a compiler or a memory routine silently break a rule people depend on? Write the rule precisely, then ask a proof checker to verify it for every input covered by its assumptions.
Our goal is to follow a contract’s rules from the Solidity a person reads to the EVM bytecode that handles their assets.
- Solidity
- identity(x) returns x
- EVM instruction
- RETURN
- Checker result
- Accepted
The contract returns the supplied integer. The checker accepts the certificate for these exact creation and runtime bytes.
Why check before release?
In August 2026, GreyNoise observed an attacker using AI to investigate a published PaperCut fix. Less than four hours passed from the start of that work to the first compromise. Teams still rolling out the update were exposed.
GreyNoise investigation ↗A proof gives engineers a check they can run before shipping a change. If a person or an AI assistant rewrites a memory routine, the new version still has to satisfy the caller’s contract. The team chooses the rule and reviews the assumptions. Anything those assumptions leave out needs its own check.
What can we prove today?
Each result names the code, the rule and the conditions under which it holds.
Copy a buffer without changing its source
Zean translates a supported Zig function into a model Lean can check. In the copy example, the caller must supply initialized source words, writable destination space and disjoint ranges. Under those conditions the model reads valid words and, on success, copies them while preserving memory outside the destination.
The result covers the translated function. The Zig frontend and native backend remain part of what the caller trusts.
Keep a reverted call from leaving writes behind
Solidity Spec gives a supported subset of Solidity an executable meaning in Lean. A call can update storage or write through two references to the same memory. If it reverts, the model restores the state saved for that call.
The safety proof starts with checked functions and a valid state. Arbitrary external calls and inline assembly fall outside its scope.
Check what the compiler actually emitted
In the identity-contract example above, a certificate links a source model to the deployment and runtime bytecode from one compilation. Checking another contract or proving the compiler preserves every Solidity program is a separate obligation.
Explore our compilers →